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Coevolutionary dynamics is investigated in chemical catalysis, biological evolution, social and economic sys-
tems. The dynamics of these systems can be analyzed within the unifying framework of evolutionary game
theory. In this Letter, we show that even in well-mixed finite populations, where the dynamics is inherently
stochastic, biodiversity is possible with three cyclic dominant strategies. We show how the interplay of evolu-
tionary dynamics, discreteness of the population, and the nature of the interactions influences the coexistence of
strategies. We calculate a critical population size above which coexistence is likely.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s 02.50.Ey
Coevolution with cyclic dominance can lead to oscillatory,
chaotic and stochastic dynamics. For example, such cycles
can be found in biology [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] or in social and eco-
nomic systems [8, 9]. The simplest example for such a cyclic
dominance is the well known children’s game rock-paper-
scissors, where rock crushes scissors, scissors cuts paper and
paper wraps rock. Different biological realizations of this sys-
tem have been observed. For example, a cyclic dominance
of three male strategies has been reported in lizards [1, 2]:
Orange-throated males establish large territories holding sev-
eral females. These populations are invaded by males with
yellow-striped throats, which do not contribute to the defense
of the territory but sneak on the females. Such a population of
yellow-striped males can be invaded by blue-throated males,
which defend territories large enough to hold one female
which they defend against sneakers. Once yellow-striped
sneakers are rare, it is advantageous to defend a large territory
with several females and the cycle starts with orange-throated
males again. Another example is the competition between dif-
ferent strains of E.coli. Kerr et al. [3, 4] observed that cyclic
dominance leads to biodiversity in spatial systems, whereas
two strategies go extinct in mixed systems after a short time.
Such systems have been analyzed by evolutionary game the-
ory in great mathematical detail [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
Based on the replicator dynamics describing the dynamics in
an infinite population, general conclusions on the nature of
the payoff matrix can be made from the observation of fast
extinction. How does this picture change if we tackle the
more realistic case of stochastic dynamics in a finite popu-
lation [17, 18, 19]? Depending on population size and the
underlying microscopic process [20, 21, 22, 23], the resulting
dynamics can be very different from the the replicator equa-
tion results.
Definition of the model. – We first concentrate on the
simplest example of cyclic rock-paper-scissors dynamics, in
which all three strategies are equivalent [24]. Thus, the game
is defined by three payoffs: (i) the payoff against a dominated
strategy (set to 1). (ii) the payoff against a dominant strategy
−s, which we assume to be negative. (iii) the payoff for a tie
(set to 0). Thus, we obtain the payoff matrix


R P S
R 0 −s 1
P 1 0 −s
S −s 1 0

. (1)
Only for the standard choice s = 1, we have a zero-sum game.
An intuitive understanding how s influences the game can be
obtained from discussing two relevant cases. Large values of s
will make it successful to avoid losing, best done with staying
with the majority. In this case, a mixed equilibrium is unstable
and ultimately, only one strategy will survive. For s ≈ 0, it
is more important to win occasionally, such that the mixed
equilibrium can become stable.
Let us first recall the evolutionary dynamics in an infinite
population described by the replicator dynamics [10]. In the
replicator equation, the frequency (abundance) xk of strategy
k changes proportional to its payoff pik,
x˙k = xk (pik − 〈pi〉) . (2)
Here 〈pi〉 is the average payoff in the population. We denote
the frequencies of R, P, S as x, y, z, respectively, with x +
y + z = 1. With the standard assumption that payoffs are
determined from interactions with a representative subset of
the population, we find piR = z− sy, piP = x− sz, and piS =
y − sx. The average payoff is given by 〈pi〉 = (1 − s)(xy +
xz+yz) vanishing for the zero-sum game with s = 1. Eq. (2)
has an interior fixed point p = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). The determinant of
the payoff matrix d = 1 − s3 determines the dynamics of the
system [10]. For d > 0, which is the case for s < 1,
H = −xyz = −xy(1− x− y) (3)
is a Lyapunov function with H˙ < 0 and the interior fixed point
p is asymptotically stable. For d < 0 (s > 1), p is unstable
and the attractor of the system approaches a heteroclinic cycle
at the boundary of the simplex S3. Finally, for the zero-sum
game with s = 1 and d = 0 the function (3) is a constant of
motion, and the system infinitely oscillates around p. This is
not a purely theoretical exercise: Experiments indicate d > 0
2for the Lizard system [2] and d < 0 for the E.coli system
[3]. In theoretical approaches, often the restriction to s = 1
is made, although this is a special non-generic case [15, 16].
It has been argued that in this case, limited mobility in a spa-
tially extended system can promote biodiversity. However, for
s < 1 biodiversity is likely even in a well-mixed population
if the population is larger than Nc. In this Letter, we give an
analytical estimate for this critical population size, depending
on s and the update mechanism. For s = 1 the average time
to extinction scales linearly with the population size N [23].
For s > 1, one expects faster extinction, as the stochastic drift
and the instability of the interior fixed point act jointly. In the
most interesting case of s < 1, both forces work in opposite
directions: ForN →∞, the fixed point p is stable, but a finite
N leads to a drift towards the simplex boundaries.
Evolutionary processes. – To study dynamics in finite pop-
ulations, we study microscopic stochastic processes for the
dynamics, which lead to macroscopic equations of motion for
large populations [8, 20, 21]. As the microscopic dynamics
may depend on the system, the respective biological or be-
havioral setup may require different interaction and competi-
tion processes. To demonstrate the robustness of our results,
we consider different birth-death processes: the frequency-
dependent Moran process (MO) [17, 18, 19], and local two-
particle interaction processes [20, 21, 27, 28, 29].
In finite populations with i R-players, j P -players, and
N − i − j S-players, the payoffs can be calculated from
the equations for infinite N by replacing x → i/(N − 1),
y → j/(N − 1), and z → (N − i − j)/(N − 1). By di-
viding by N − 1 and setting the payoff for ties zero, we for-
mally exclude self-interactions. For the average payoff, we
have 〈pi〉 = i
N
piR + j
N
piP + N−i−j
N
piS .
In the frequency-dependent Moran process, an individual
reproduces proportional to its fitness. Then, the offspring re-
places a randomly selected individual [30]. The transition
probabilities of the possible six hopping events are given by
(TRS := TR→S)
TRS =
1
2
1− w + wpiS
1− w + w〈pi〉
i
N
N − i − j
N
(4)
T SR =
1
2
1− w + wpiR
1− w + w〈pi〉
i
N
N − i − j
N
(5)
and T SP , TPS, TPR, TRP are obtained by cyclic permuta-
tion of (R,P, S) and (i, j, N − i − j). Fitness is a convex
combination of a constant background fitness (set to 1) and
the payoff. The parameter w > 0 controls the intensity of se-
lection; random genetic drift is obtained forw → 0. For better
comparison with the processes below, we have introduced an
additional factor 1/2.
Selecting an individual proportional to fitness requires
knowledge about every payoff in the population. In many
cases, it is more realistic to assume that competition occurs
locally between two individuals. One process of this type is
the local update (LU) process [20, 21], where one individ-
ual b is selected randomly for reproduction, compares with
annother randomly chosen individual a, and changes strategy
with probability 12 (1 + w(pia − pib)) [31]. In general, the re-
productive fitness can depend in a nonlinear way on the pay-
off difference between two competing agents. as in the Fermi
process (FP) [27, 28, 29].
We now unify the processes by means of a reproductive
function,
ΦMO(b→ a) =
1
2
1− w + wpia
1− w + w〈pi〉
(6)
ΦLM(b→ a) = (1 + w(pia − 〈pi〉))/2 (7)
ΦLU(b→ a) = (1 + w(pia − pib))/2 (8)
ΦFP(b→ a) = [1 + exp(−w(pia − pib)))]
−1. (9)
By (7) we introduce a linearized Moran (LM) process as first
order approximation of the MO in the limit of weak selection,
w → 0. For w = 0, selection is neutral and the four processes
are identical with random drift. Note that for the Moran
processes, Φ(b→ a) depends on the average payoff, whereas
for the other processes two individual payoffs are involved.
The transition probabilities become
T ba = Φ(b→ a)NaNb /N
2. (10)
For all processes, Φ(b → a) considers a two-particle (birth-
death) process where an individual with fitness pia compares
with the average fitness 〈pi〉 or with annother individual pib.
Average drift. – For the replicator equation of the symmet-
ric RPS dynamics, Eq. (3) defines a constant of motion. As we
are interested in the finite-size corrections, we can use H as an
observable for the distance to the interior fixed point. For the
processes defined above, the transition probabilities allow to
calculate the average change of the constant of motion within
the simplex (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N − 1) as [32]
〈∆H〉 =
2
N5
N−1∑
i=1
N−i−1∑
j=1
[
ij(N − i− j)(TRS + T SR + T SP + TPS + TPR + TRP ) (11)
− (i − 1)j(N − i− j + 1)TRS − (i + 1)j(N − i− j − 1)T SR − i(j + 1)(N − i− j − 1)T SP
− i(j − 1)(N − i− j + 1)TPS − (i+ 1)(j − 1)(N − i− j)TPR − (i− 1)(j + 1)(N − i− j)TRP
]
.
These expressions give the exact average drift. For the two linear processes, we can approximate the average drift by replacing
3the sums by integrals. Using x = i/N , y = j/N , and z = 1− x− y, we find in the continuum limit
〈∆H〉 = −
2
N
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ 1−x
0
dy
[
y(x− z)
(
TRS − T SR
)
+ x(z − y)
(
T SP − TPS
)
+ z(y − x)
(
TPR − TRP
) ]
+
2
N2
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ 1−x
0
dy
[
y
(
TRS + T SR
)
+ x
(
T SP + TPS
)
+ z
(
TPR + TRP
) ]
. (12)
From this expression, we can perform a comparison of 〈∆H〉
for the different processes. The neutral case as well as the
linear cases are analyzed below analytically, in Fig. 1 all pro-
cesses are compared numerically.
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FIG. 1: (Color online.) Drift reversal for the four processes; the
Linearized Moran and Fermi process coincide within line thickness.
The main panel shows the scaling with population size N for fixed
w = 0.45 and s = 0.8. Full lines and the dotted line show the
numerical solutions of Eq. (11). The dashed lines are the analytical
expansions Eqs. (15) and (17). For small N , the continuum approx-
imation to the integral leads to deviations. Inset: Average drift for
varying payoff matrix with fixed w = 0.45 and N = 1000. The
processes intersect in ∆H = 1/(20N2) at s = 1 (d = 0) . For
N → ∞, this reduces to the expectation based on the replicator
equation, ∆H = 0 in d = 0. The intersection with the horizontal
line indicates the drift reversal in finite populations.
For neutral evolution, w = 0, all terms of type TRS − T SR
vanish, and we have TRS = T SR = xz/2, T SP = TPS =
yz/2, TPR = TRP = xy/2, i.e. for w = 0,
〈∆H〉 =
2
N2
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ 1−x
0
dy
6xyz
2
=
1
20N2
. (13)
Now we consider the linear terms in w. For the linear local
update, we find TRS − T SR = w xz(piS − piR), thus
TRS − T SR = w xz((y − z) + s(y − x)). (14)
Due to ΦLU (b → a) + ΦLU (a → b) = 1, the terms of order
N−2 in Eq. (12) cancel. In first and second order of w, we
have
〈∆H〉LU =
1
20N2
−
1− s
420N
w. (15)
For the linearized Moran process, the contributions of the
average payoff vanish for the drift term, and the calculation
above reproduces with an additional factor 1/2, i.e. TRS −
T SR = w2 xz(pi
S − piR). For the diffusion term, we find
TRS + T SR = xz(1 +
w
2
(piS + piR − 2〈pi〉)) (16)
and cyclic permutations. Thus, we get an additional contribu-
tion to the diffusion. In summary, we have
〈∆H〉LM =
1
20N2
−
1− s
420N
(
1
2
−
1
N
)
w. (17)
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FIG. 2: (Color online.) Critical population size: Intensity of selection
w versus critical population size Nc, where ∆H changes its sign
for fixed s = 0.8. For N > Nc the drift is towards the internal
fixed point. The dashed lines refer to the Lizard’s payoff matrix [1]
for MO and LU. Under strong selection w = 1 the LU reverses at
Nc = 20. For the restricted random matrix ensemble (green circles,
see text) under LU Nc coincides with the case of eq. 1. Each symbol
corresponds to a single random payoff matrix. (inset: scatter plot of
payoff entries in N 1st, H 2nd,  3rd column).
Biodiversity threshold. – Both Eqs. (15) and (17) can
change their sign for s < 1 depending on N . For all four pro-
cesses, Fig. 1 shows the average drift for different payoffs and
population sizes. All processes intersect in +1/(20N2) for
s = 1. In this case, we have a zero-sum game and the average
drift is equal to neutral selection. The finite-size correction
to the vanishing drift term of neutral selection arises from the
difference between our microscopic processes and symplectic
integrators [25, 26]. In the N → ∞ limit we recover that the
4stability of the interior fixed point is governed by the sign of
the determinant of the payoff matrix, d = 1 − s3. For s < 1
andN →∞, trajectories spiral inwards. In finite populations,
for s < 1 the stochastic motion can be reversed as shown in
Fig. 1. The critical population size of the biodiversity thresh-
old is Nc = 21w(1−s) for the LU and Nc = 2 +
42
w(1−s) for
the LM. The biodiversity threshold Nc for the other process is
computed numerically in Fig. 2. For N > Nc, the N → ∞
behaviour is recovered, but for N < Nc the interior fixed
point becomes unstable and the average drift goes towards the
boundaries. So far, we have worked with the specific payoff
matrix Eq. (1). Next, we show that this is a more general phe-
nomenon. The drift reversal is preserved for general cyclic
payoffs with Nc depending on the payoff matrix [33]. As an
example, we consider the payoff matrix of the Lizard system
[1]. In this case, we find Nc ≥ 20, see Fig. 2. More general,
we can also address random payoff matrices with cyclic dom-
inance. Confining a random matrix ensemble (Fig. 2) onto
a suitable 2-dim submanifold [34], we show that Nc(w) de-
pends only on the location of the fixed point p, its normaliza-
tion constant Σ and the determinant d, i.e. on 4 parameters.
Hence the phenomenon is generic for arbitrary cyclic payoff
matrices with d > 0.
To conclude, cyclic coevolution in biological or social dy-
namics highlights the importance to study finite population ef-
fects and the underlying microscopic dynamics. Recently the
influence of the finiteness of the population has been widely
discussed for 2×2 games [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. But also in
cyclic dynamics the finiteness of the population can modify
the stability conditions derived from the replicator equation.
In this Letter, we have shown that biodiversity threshold of the
population size occurs in generic cyclic 3×3 games for a posi-
tive determinant of the payoff matrix. Such a positive determi-
nant has been found in the Lizard system [1, 2]. Thus, stability
of the coexistence fixed point can be obtained for sufficiently
large populations, preserving biodiversity even in non-spatial
systems or under strong mobility. In contrast, experiments in
well-mixed populations of the E.coli system indicate a nega-
tive determinant of the payoff matrix.
Here we have demonstrated how nonzero-sum payoffs can
change the stability even in well-mixed systems. Thus in bio-
logical — and corresponding social or economic — systems,
payoff matrix, population structure, population size and the
microscopic update mechanism determine the fate of extinc-
tion or coexistence.
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